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  This paper investigates how the soft budget constraint with grants from the 
central government to local governments tends to internalize the vertical 
externality by stimulating insufficient local expenditure when both the central and 
local governments impose taxes on the same economic activities from public 
investment. The theoretical model incorporates local governments’ rent-seeking 
activities in a multi-government setting with and without central controls on local 
borrowing. Two channels through debt issuance and public investment cause the 
soft budget outcome. In the unrestricted scheme of local debt issuance we have the 
positive effect on public investment and debt issuance although it would also 
stimulate wasteful rent seeking activities. In the restricted scheme of local debt 
issuance the soft budget case may not stimulate public investment since its effect 
through debt issuance is absent. In either case the soft budget constraint is welfare 
improving if the marginal valuation of central public goods is relatively small and/or 
the tax share of local government is relatively small. 
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1. Introduction 
  This paper investigates how local governments increase insufficient local 
public expenditures by highlighting the soft-budget constraint of grants from the 
central (or federal) government to subnational governments (hereafter local 
governments) based on the rent-seeking activities by the local governments.  
Namely, this paper will analyze theoretically welfare implications of the soft-budget 
constraint of intergovernmental financing on local expenditures by developing a 
simple game between the two governments with the overlapping tax bases. 
Incorporating the rent-seeking activities of local politicians or governments, we 
explore both positive and negative effects of soft budget using two cases with and 
without central controls on local borrowing.   
  It is well recognized that if local governments face soft budget constraints, 
they will have an incentive to over-spend, over-borrow, and/or pay insufficient 
attention to the quality of the investments that their borrowing finances.  Such 
over-spending/borrowing can occur through the common pool mechanism. See, for 
example, Wildasin (1997, 2004), Goodspeed (2002), Akai and Sato (2005), and 
Boadway and Tremblay (2005) among others.  That is, the natural conjecture is 
that if the central government imposes soft budget constraints, inefficient too much 
investment should arise. On the other hand, recently Besfamille and Lockwood 
(2004) show that hard budget constraints can be too hard and discourage 
investment that is socially efficient.    Namely, they point out the possibility that the 
hard budget constraint over-incentives the soft budget constraint to provide effort 
by penalizing it too much for project failure, thus leading ultimately to the 
possibility that socially efficient projects may not be undertaken.     
In this paper without incorporating any uncertainty or imperfect 
information of effort with respect to public investment and other government 
activities but with incorporating rent-seeking activities by local politicians and 
vertical tax externality between the local and central governments, we show that 
two channels through debt issuance and public investment cause the soft budget 
outcome. While the soft budget constraint does not necessarily realize the first best 
solution and it would stimulate wasteful rent seeking activities, the soft budget 
constraint may be better off than the hard budget constraint case by stimulating 
local public works and hence by internalizing the vertical externality to some 
extent. 
  We pay attention to the vertical externality of shared tax bases between the 
central and local governments. Multileveled government normally means some 
commonality of tax base between central and local governments. As a result the tax 
base may overlap and shared tax bases create another type of common pool problem.   
It is now well recognized in the tax competition literature that such vertical 
externalities are likely to leave local taxes too high.  This is because each local   3 
government unduly discounts the pressure on central government’s spending it 
creates by raising its own tax rate.    See Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), Keen (1998), 
and Wilson (1999) among others. In this paper we do not consider such 
vertical/horizontal tax competition between central and multi local governments 
and would simply assume that tax rates are given both for central and multi local 
governments. Rather, we would like to focus on another externality of local 
expenditures due to overlapping tax bases.   
By assuming that the tax share is exogenously given, local public 
investment may have a positive vertical externality effect. Namely, if an increase in 
local expenditure on infrastructure stimulates macroeconomic activities, it may 
enlarge the overlapping tax base, which would then increase taxes for the central 
government at the given share of tax base between two governments.  This is a 
positive spillover of vertical externality.  In this sense, the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium level of local public investment is too low.   
In a two period model the benevolent central government may have an 
incentive to issue more debt and stimulate local expenditure in period 2 by means of 
additional grants ex post. However, such additional grants could produce soft 
budget problems by increasing grants when the rent-seeking local government 
spends and borrows more in period 1. Two channels through debt issuance and 
public investment cause the soft budget outcome. First, local borrowing more in 
period 1 means a decline in local public goods in period 2 and hence upsets the 
central government's optimal allocation strategy, as stressed by Goodspeed (2002). 
Second, public investment more means an increase in the revenue of central 
government and hence the central government may subsidize the local government 
more in period 2, which is a new channel explored in this paper since this channel 
comes from the vertical externality. 
In this game, the behavior of local government and hence the soft budget 
outcome are also dependent on the scheme of local debt finance. The central 
government may have some power to control the issuance of local debt. We consider 
two cases with and without ex ante central controls on local borrowing and compare 
the hard budget and soft budget constraints in each case of local debt scheme. The 
soft-budget constraint may not be worse since it would stimulate local public 
investment due to the above two channels, which is beneficial.    On the other hand, 
it would also stimulate the rent-seeking activity and additional grants, which is not 
beneficial. We shall show that if the marginal valuation of central public goods is 
relatively small and/or the tax share of local government is relatively small, the 
former benevolent effect is more powerful.    In the restricted scheme the soft budget 
due to debt issuance disappears, and it may not always stimulate public investment, 
while it would not stimulate additional grants much. Its welfare effect is 
qualitatively the same as in the unrestricted scheme of local debt issuance.   4 
  This paper consists of five sections. In Section 2 we develop a theoretical 
model of the central and local governments, and then consider the outcome of the 
first best as the reference point. In section 3 we investigate the game between the 
benevolent central government and the rent-seeking local government with and 
without controls of local debt issuance. In section 4 we introduce the ex post transfer 
from the central government to the local government to explore the soft-budget 
problem with and without central controls on local borrowing.    Finally, we present 
some concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
2. Analytical Model of Central and Local Governments 
2.1 Analytical Framework 
  We develop a two-period intergovernmental financing model of two 
governments, the central government (or CG), the lower-level local government (or 
LG) in a small open economy, in order to explain how local public investment and 
wasteful spending may be stimulated under the soft-budget constraint.  For 
simplicity, we consider the representative local government, and do not consider the 
free-riding and/or spillover effects within multi local governments. This is just an 
assumption for simplicity. There are many papers to explore the horizontal and 
vertical externalities due to non-cooperative competition among multi local 
governments.  See Wilson (1999) among others. As shown in Appendix 1, the 
analytical results would be qualitatively the same even if we consider 
non-cooperative behavior of multi-local governments. Moreover, this is in particular 
a good approximation of Japan’s case where many local governments behave 
cooperatively against the central government and their behavior may be 
summarized by the representative local government (the Ministry of Home Affairs).   
In the conventional literature the soft-budget outcome occurs only if there 
are many local governments, who behave non-cooperatively. One contribution of 
this paper is to show that the soft-budget outcome could occur even in the case of 
the representative local government.  This is a new result since the conventional 
literature on the soft budget always assumes multi-local governments. 
The representative local government (LG) provides useful local public goods 
gt, and the central government (CG) provides useful nation-wide public goods Gt in 
each period. Each public good is beneficial and its utility is given by a 
twice-continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave function. Moreover, we 
assume that all goods are normal ones.  The relative price of each good is set to be 
unity for simplicity.  Thus, the social welfare W, which reflects the representative 
agent’s preferences over public goods, is given by 
  W = )} ( ) ( { ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 g v G u g v G u + + + δ      (1) 
where 0 < δ <1 is a discount factor. Since S is wasteful, it does not appear in (1). For 
simplicity, private consumption is assumed to be fixed and hence we only consider   5 
the utility from public goods. This formulation may be justified since we assume 
that the tax rate on consumers is fixed and labor supply is exogenously given. Even 
if we consider private consumption explicitly in the social welfare, the analytical 
results are qualitatively the same. See section 5.6. 
  The local government conducts public investment k in period 1, which has a 
productive effect of raising tax revenue in period 2. Let Yt represent total tax 
revenue of the two governments in period t ( t = 1, 2).  We assume that Y1 is 
exogenously given but Y2 is dependent on public works conducted by the local 
government in period 1.   ) ( 1 2 k f Y Y + = .  k denotes local public investment in 
period 1, which would increase total tax revenue of period 2.  Investment product 
function f( ) satisfies the standard Inada condition: f’( )>0, f”( )<0. For simplicity we 
do not consider public investment by the central government. In a multi-local 
government setting local public investment may have spillover effects over regions.  
However, in this paper since we consider the representative local government, we 
do not incorporate such spillovers. Still public investment has the vertical 
externality effect on the central government’s tax revenue. See section 5.5. 
  Both central and local governments levy taxes on overlapping economic 
activities.  Since the tax base is overlapping, the tax revenue is shared by the two 
governments. We set β as local government’s portion of total tax revenue, 0<β <1. 
The central government gains a portion of the total tax revenue.    Thus 1 – β means 
share of the central government to total tax revenue.  The share parameter β is 
assumed to be exogenously given and constant over time. Or we could regard βY as 
the subsidy from CG to LG.    See also section 5.2. 
  We consider pork barrel spending by the local government. As shown in 
DelRossi and Inman (1999), pork barrel projects are too high due to subsidies from 
the central government caused by local governments’ political demand. In the 
tradition of Leviathan models of government (see Brennn and Buchanan (1980) 
among others), the local politicians prefer “wasteful” public spending (S), which 
provides them with rent-seeking opportunities but does not voters or consumers. 
Next, we specify each government's budget constraint. The period-by-period 
budget constraints of CG are given as follows, 
  1 1 ) 1 ( Y G B β − − =       (2-1) 
  2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( Y B r G β − = + +        (2-2) 
where  B is the central government debt.  r >0 is the exogenously given world 
interest rate. 
  The period-by-period budget constraints of LG are given as follows, 
  11 DgkYS β =+ − +        (3-1) 
  22 (1 ) gr D Y β ++ =        (3-2) 
where  D  is the local government debt. Without loss of generality S appears only in   6 
period 1.   
From (2-1,2) and (3-1,2) we can rewrite the intertemporal budget 
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2.2 Pareto Efficient Solution 
  First of all, we investigate the Pareto efficient first best allocation in this 
model as a benchmark.  Since we do not incorporate any uncertainty or imperfect 
information with respect to public investment and other government activities in 
the unitary system, unitary benevolent government, consolidating CG and LG, 
could attain the first best by allocating optimally the total tax revenues among 
nation-wide public goods and local public goods in each period. Namely, the unitary 
government, who implements the optimal allocation {, , } tt Ggk, maximizes social 
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which is obtained from (2-3) and (3-3) by eliminating  β . 
First order conditions of this optimization problem are as follows, 

























































μ is the Lagrangian multiplier of equation (4).    From these conditions we have 
  1 1 G g u v =        (5-1) 
  22 Gg uv =         ( 5 - 2 )












G + = =        (5-3) 
  r k f + = ′ 1 ) (         (5-4)   7 
 S = 0          ( 5 - 5 )  
The above optimality conditions (5-1,.,5) and the feasibility condition (4) determine 
the Pareto efficient allocation as the benchmark case. Conditions (5-1)(5-2) mean 
that the marginal benefit of pubic goods is equalized between CG and LG. Condition 
(5-3) governs the standard (intertemporal) optimal allocation of public spending 
between two periods.  Condition (5-4) is the standard first-best criterion of public 
investment. Finally, condition (5-5) is obviously the efficiency condition. Here exist 
any rent-seeking activities: S=0. 
 
3. Outcome in a Decentralized System 
3.1 Benchmark Case of Decentralization: Game I 
Unrestricted Scheme of Local Debt Issuance 
We now investigate outcomes in a decentralized system of a 
multi-government non-cooperative world where benevolent central and 
rent-seeking local governments decide their policy variables non-cooperatively.  
CG is the leader and LG is the follower. The game is done at the beginning of period 
1. We consider two cases with respect to the issuance of local public debt.   
First of all we investigate the fully (or isolated) decentralized Nash 
equilibrium at the exogenously given  β >0, where there is no restriction of issuing 
LG’ debt imposed by CG. Namely, in this game (Game I) at the first stage CG 
determines public goods  12 , GG , and then at the second stage LG determines its 
expenditures,  12 ,, ggk , D, and S. Here we have the unrestricted scheme of local 
debt issuance, and hence LG may choose any amount of D. 
CG maximizes (1) subject to (2-3) by choosing nation wide public goods.  
On the other hand, LG, who represents the interest of rent-seeking local politicians, 
maximizes wasteful public spending or rent, S by choosing local public goods and 
investment, subject to her budget constraint (3-3) and the following survival 
constraint. 
12 () () vg vg U δ +=        ( 6 )  
where  U   means the reservation utility which represents the preferences of voters. 
If (6) is not satisfied, voters do not re-elect them and local politicians cannot stay at 
the office of local government. It is plausible to assume that 
  12 () ()
FF F U U vg vg δ <≡ +  
where  12 ,
FF gg   are the first best levels of  12 , gg , respectively. 
 
Second Stage 
Let us investigate the outcome of this game, Game I. LG’s problem is   8 
 Max  S=
22
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 st.  (6) 
Then, first order conditions are as follows, 
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δ =+         (7-2) 
From these conditions (6), (7-1)(7-2),  12 ,, ggk , D, and S are determined.    Condition 








minimized under the survival condition. (6) and (7-2) determine  12 , gg  in  this  game, 
**
12 , gg .  (7-1) determines k in this game, k*, and (3-2) determines S. Note that the 
optimal levels of  12 ,, ggk , D, and S are not dependent on CG’s choice variables of 




CG maximizes (1) subject to (2-3) by choosing nation wide public goods at 
given levels of  12 ,, ggk , D, and S, which are determined by LG from the second 
stage of the game. Then, we have 
  1 0 G u −Ψ=  



















δ =+         ( 8 )  
Condition (8) means that social welfare  12 () () uG uG δ +  is maximized under the 







, associated with k*. 
 
Outcome  


























δ =+         ( 8 )  
Conditions (7-2)(8), which are the same as (5-3), imply that relative (intertemporal) 
allocation between g1 and g2 as well as relative (intertemporal) allocation between 
G1 and G2 is efficient. But the levels of these public goods and local investment are 
not necessarily provided optimally.  In other words, conditions (5-1)(5-2) do not 

















arbitrarily set, depending on the exogenous parameter, β , the rent-seeking 
behavior of LG, and the survival condition (6).   
Moreover, considering  β <1, (7-1) means that k is under-provided due to 
the vertical externality of the overlapping tax base:  *
F kk < , where  * k  is the 
solution of k in this game and 
F k  is the solution of k at the first best solution. 
Condition (5-4) does not hold. Since the local government does not take into account 
the positive spillover effect of increasing the overlapping tax base on public goods 
provided by the central government, local public investment provided by the local 
government is not sufficient and total tax revenue shared by both governments in 
period 2 is inefficiently low.  Condition (5-5) does not hold either due to the 
rent-seeking behavior of LG. 
To sum up, there are three sources of inefficiency in the decentralized 
system.  First,  β is not necessarily set at the optimal level and hence the allocation 
of public spending between CG and LG is not determined optimally.    Second, there 
is a vertical externality of public investment due to the overlapping tax base, and 
hence k is too little.  Finally, due to the sent-seeking activities of LG (
F UU < ), 
local public goods  12 , gg  are too little and wasteful public spending S becomes 
positive. 
 
3.2 Restriction of D: Game II 
  Suppose CG cannot control the rent seeking behavior of LG, but can control 
local debt issuance. We now consider the restricted scheme of local debt case where 
CG can determine the amount of D at the first stage of this game as  D  in Game II. 
Namely, CG can set any level of  D in order to maximize the social welfare. In the 
second stage LG determines  12 ,, ggk at given level of  D.    In this game LG faces a   10 
sort of liquidity constraint. The subgame perfect equilibrium is not necessarily the 




11 SD Ygk β =+ −−  
by choosing  1 g  and k   subject to the following survival constraint 
12 () ( ( 1 )) vg v Y rD U δβ +− + = .      (6)’ 










δβ =         ( 9 )  
Since local debt is not used for intertemporal transfer by LG, the effective relative 
price between  1 g  and  2 g  is now given as  ' f δβ , which is the (discounted) 
effective marginal product of local investment. 
From this condition (9) and the survival condition (6)’ we may derive the 
response functions of LS as 
  1 () gg D = %         ( 1 0 - 1 )  
  () kk D = %         ( 1 0 - 2 )  
  In Figure 1 the SS curve shows a locus of ( 1, gk ) which satisfies condition 
(6)’.  This curve is downward sloping.  The FOC curve shows a locus of ( 1, gk ) 
which satisfies condition (9).  This curve is upward sloping.  An increase in  D 
would shift both curves to the right.    Hence, it would stimulate  k , and its effect on 
1 g  is also positive.   '( ) 0 kD> %  and  '( ) gD %  >0. Intuition is as follows. When D 
rises at a given level of k,  2 g  declines and  2 g v  rises, which raises the right hand 
side of (9), the marginal benefit of transfer from period 1 to period 2.  Hence, it 
would stimulate k.  1 g   has to rise to maintain (6)’. 
  Let us discuss the economic implication of (9).  When both (7-1) and (7-2) 
hold, we get (9).    In other words, if  D  happens to be equal to the solution of  D in 










δ <+ , then (9) implies  '1 f r β < +  (and vice versa). In such a 
case k is greater than in Game I.  Since  '( ) 0 kD> % , this case corresponds to 
D> * D .   
  We can show that S is always smaller than in Game I. In Game II the total   11 







  is larger than in Game I.    And, so long 









 is smaller than in Game I. 
Hence, S becomes smaller at Game II than at Game I.   
 
First Stage 
  At the first stage of game, CG maximizes the national welfare (1) subject to 
its budget constraints and the response functions of local governments by 
choosingD  as well as nation-wide public goods  12 , GG   and public debt B.     
 Max  12 () ( () ) { () [ ( () )( 1 )] } uG vgD uG v f kD rD δβ +++ − + % %  
subject to 
  12 1
11
(1 )[ ( ( )]
11
GG Yf k D
rr
β += − +
++
%  
Then, the first order conditions are 
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where  λ   is the Lagrange multiplier of the above budget constraint of CG.   
















%      (11) 
The left hand side of (11) means a marginal benefit of an increase in  D, while the 
right hand side means a marginal cost of an increase in  D. Namely, an increase in 
D stimulates k and hence tax revenues of CG, resulting in an increase in  12 , GG , 
which is the merit.  On the other hand, it directly reduces  2 g  by raising interest 
payments, which is the cost.  Condition (11) determines the optimal level of  D, 
* D , where the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost. The subgame perfect 
solution of  D,  * D . is not necessarily equal to the equilibrium value in Game I, 
* D . When  ** DD = , then  ** kk =  and hence the solution of Game II is identical 
to that of Game I. 
 
Remark 
  Under the constraint (6) or (6)’ the ex post social welfare may be rewritten   12 
as 
  12 () () Wu G u G U δ =+ +        ( 1 ) ’  
Since  U  is exogenously given, ex post W is only dependent on CG’s provision of 
public goods. In both Games I and II CG faces the same budget constraint (2-3) and 
chooses the same optimality condition with respect to nation-wide public goods (8). 
It follows that the total utility from provision of  12 , GG  is maximized at given level 
of k. Thus, if k is higher, then the right hand side of (2-3) is larger, and the resulting 
social welfare is also higher.   
When CG takes the survival condition into her optimizing behavior, then it 
would be optimal to stimulate k as much as possible by raising  D.  However, the 
optimizing behavior in this section does not assume this possibility.  Namely, we 
assume that even if CG knows LG’s response functions (10-1)(10-2) well, CG does 
not consider the survival condition (6).  In such a case (11) gives the optimal level 
of  D,  * D , which is not necessarily larger than  * D ,  D i n  G a m e  I .   I n  o t h e r  
words, if  ** DD > , then Game II produces higher welfare than Game I (and vice 
versa). 
  On the other hand, if CG takes the survival condition into her optimizing 
behavior, then CG intends to increase D as much as possible.  In reality it is 
possible to restrict the amount of  D  to the level less than  * D , but it is not easy to 
set  D to the level more than  * D .  One plausible assumption is that CG could 
control  D  only under the condition of  * DD < .    If this condition is imposed, then 
the optimal level ofD,  * D , is equal to  * D .  In other words, if CG takes the 
survival condition into her optimizing behavior, then it is optimal for CG not to 
restrict the issuance of local debt finance. 
 
4 Additional Transfers     
4.1 Game I 
CG’s Ex Post Transfer: Third Stage 
  In Game I, when period 2 comes, CG may not want to commit to the initial 
level ofβ .    CG may effectively raise  β   by creating grants to LG ex post. This is a 
time inconsistency problem. Thus, LG faces to the soft-budget constraint.    We first 
investigate the optimizing behavior of CG at the beginning of the second period as 
the third stage of this game.    After LG determines local expenditures, g1 , S and k , 
in period 1, CG may effectively choose its public spending G2 and g2 subject to the 
budget conditions (2-2) and (3-2) by creating an additional grant, A, appropriately in 
period 2.     
The budget constraint of the central government in period 2 is rewritten as 
  G2 + (1+ r )B = (1–β)Y2  A −      (2-2’)   13 
Similarly, the budget constraint of the local government in period 2 is rewritten as 
  22 (1 ) gr D Y A β ++ = +       (3-2)’ 
From (2-2’) and (3-2’) eliminating  A  gives the relevant overall budget constraint in 
period 2 as   
  2 2 2 ) )( 1 ( Y D B r g G = + + + +       ( 1 2 )  
By choosing A e x  p o s t  i n  p e r i o d  2 ,  t h e  central government may in fact 
choose the allocation of G2 and g2 under the above overall constraint (12) to 
maximize the social welfare in period 2;  22 () () uG vg + . The rent seeking activity 
has already done in period 1. Here at ex post the survival condition (6) is no longer 
binding.    Thus, the first-order condition at the third stage of this game is given by 
  22 Gg uv =         ( 1 3 )  
From the above optimality condition (13) and the ex post budget constraints (2-2’), 
(3-2’), at given levels of local expenditures D and k, which are chosen in period 1, we 
may derive the optimal response of A, g2 (and hence G2) of the central government as 
functions of D and k, respectively.    
  (,) A JDk =         ( 1 4 - 1 )  
  2 (,) gP D k =         ( 1 4 - 2 )  
By totally differentiating the budget conditions (2-2’) and (12) and the 
optimality condition (5-2), we have 
  22 (1 ) ( ) dG dg r dD f k dk ′ ++ + =  
  22 (1 )dG dg η η −=  
  2 (1 ) ( ) dG f k dk dA β ′ =− −  
where  η   22 2 /[ ] gg GG gg vu v ≡+  means the relative evaluation of G2 compared with 
g2.  It is assumed for simplicity that 01 η < <  is constant.  Then, considering 
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(15-1) shows the standard outcome of the soft budget constraint due to local 
debt (See Goodspeed (2002)).    An increase in  D  results in a decrease in  2 g  at  the 
given level of  2 G , leading to more grants A from the central government.  0 D J > .   14 
Intuition is as follows.  When more debt D is issued, g2 falls from (3-2) while  2 G  
rises from (2-2). This outcome is not good for the central government since it would 
like to realize the optimality condition (5-2) to raise social welfare.  Thus, the 
central government has an incentive to make additional subsidies to the local 
government in period 2 to raise the ex post level of g2 and reduce the ex post level of 
2 G .  
Moreover, we have another outcome of the soft-budget result due to public 
investment,  0 k J > , which is a new channel due to the vertical externality. As 
shown in (15-2), the sign of  k J  is generally ambiguous.  If 1–β > η, then  0 k J >  
(and vice versa).    That is, if the marginal valuation of G2 is relatively small and 1–β 
is too high, g2 is too low compared with G2, and hence the central government would 
react to increase A in order to maximize the ex post social welfare.  Intuition is as 
follows. An increase in k results in an increase in the tax revenue of CG by the 
amount of (1 ) ' f β −  and an increase in  2 G  by the amount of  ' f η . If 1 β η −>, 
CG would react to give more grants A to LG.   
  A key part of the model is the interaction between the central government 
and the local government.    The central government intends to allocate revenues to 
equalize marginal gains of public goods between the central and local governments.   
The central government’s benevolent incentives result in a soft budget constraint by 
creating additional grants in period 2 when the local government borrows more and 
invest more in period 1.  Two channels through debt issuance and public 
investment cause the soft budget outcome. First, local borrowing more in period 1 
means a decline in local public goods in period 2 and hence upsets the central 
government's optimal allocation strategy.    Second, local investment more in period 
1 means an increase in the tax revenue of the central government in period 2 and 
hence raises the amount of central public goods. Then, the central government 
intends to maximize the social welfare in period 2 by making additional grants in 
period 2 in response to local borrowing more and public investment more in period 
1.   
 
LG’s Behavior: Second Stage 
We now investigate the optimizing behavior of the local government at the 
beginning of period 1 in the soft-budget version of Game I.    The local government's 
survival constraint (6) is effectively binding here only under the condition that the 
central government changes A in response to local expenditures of period 1, as 
summarized by equation (14-1,2).    Namely, the survival condition and the effective 
budget constraint for the local government are given by 
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     (16) 
The local government maximizes the objective S subject to (6)’ (16) at given levels of 
tax share parameter β. Note that at this stage the survival condition (6)’ is binding.   
Therefore, the first order conditions with respect to its policy variables, g1 , 
D, and k, are respectively given as follows, 
1 10 g v ω −− =         ( 1 7 - 1 )  
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     (17-3) 
where  ω  (>0) is the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (6)’.  Equations (17-1,2) 
govern the allocation of g1 and  2 g  at a given level of tax share parameter  β , and 
U .  
Substituting (15-1,3) into (17-1)(17-2), we have 
  12 (1 )(1 ) gg vv r δ η =− +        (18-1) 
Thus, the optimality condition between  1 g  and  2 g   given by (6) is not realized here 
at the subgame perfect solution.  If CG did not make additional grants A, the 
optimizing behavior of LG could have attained condition (5-3) with respect to the 
relative allocation of  1 g  and  2 g . When LG takes into account the response 
functions of CG, (14-1,2), it would effectively reduce the marginal cost of raising g1, 
stimulating g1 in period 1. (18-1) means that  1 g   is too high, compared with  2 g and 







, is larger 
than in section 3.1. The soft budget constrain would result in an increase in A, 
which has a positive effect on  1 g .  
  Next, substituting (15-2,4) into (17-2), we have 
  12 (1 ) ' g g vf v δ η =−        (18-2) 
Considering (18-1) and (18-2), we finally get 
  1' rf +=         (5-4) 
It follows that at the subgame perfect solution k is larger than in section 3.1.    This 
is a plausible result of the soft budget constraint.  When k rises, LG may expect 
additional grants A from CG resulting from an increase in  2 (1 )Y β −  in addition to 
its own tax revenue  2 Y β , so that the effective marginal benefit of an increase in k 
becomes  ' f , not  ' f β . Note that the first stage of this game is the same as in 
section 3.1. CG determines  12 , GG   to attain (8).   16 
 
Welfare Comparison 
  We have shown that the soft budget constraint stimulates public 
investment. However, at the same time A is generally positive, which hurts the 
social welfare.  We now investigate the overall welfare effect of soft-budget 
constraint. When A is explicitly included, the ex post budget constraint of CG is 
given as 






β += − +−
++ +
     (2-3)’ 
An increase in k may raise A directly and indirectly, as shown in (15-2) and (15-1). 
On the other hand, when k is raised, it can enlarge the tax revenue of CG.  The 
overall impact of an increase in k on CG’ net tax revenue excluding A, the right 
hand side of (2-3)’,    is 
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If  10 β η −−> , then the left hand side of inequality (19), R, is positive and 
an increase in k raises the right hand of (2-3)’, which is beneficial.  In such a case, 
the soft-budget version of Game I actually raises the social welfare.  On the other 
hand, if 10 β η −−<, then R is negative. This undesirable outcome could occur 
since A may be too much and the total spending on local public goods to maintain 
the reservation utility  U   also increase much. In such a case, an increase in k does 
not enlarge the overall tax revenues available to CG, so that spending on central 
public goods would decrease. 
 
4.2 Game II 
CG’s Transfer: Third Stage 
  We then investigate Game II.  Here again CG faces the same time 
inconsistency  problem.  Namely,  after LG determines local expenditures, g1 , S and 
k , in period 1, CG may effectively choose its public spending G2 and g2 subject to the 
budget conditions (2-2) and (3-2) by creating an additional grant, A, appropriately in   17 
period 2. We consider the optimizing behavior of CG at the beginning of the second 
period in Game II as the third stage of this game.  The analytical results are 
almost the same as in Game I. 
  Namely, in place of (14-1,2) we have 
(,) AJ D k =         ( 2 1 - 1 )  
  2 (,) gP D k =         ( 2 1 - 2 )  
Since  D is already given, LG’s choice would affect CG’s behavior only through k. 
The soft budget does not have the channel through debt issuance. It only comes 
from the channel through local investment. 
By totally differentiating the survival condition (6), the optimality 
condition (5-2) and (13), we have 
  2 ' dg f dk dA β =+  
  22 (1 )dG dg η η −=  
  2 (1 ) ( ) dG f k dk dA β ′ =− −  
Then, considering (2-2’), we have as the property of response functions   








        








> 0         
which are the same as (15-2) and (15-4). 
 
LG’s Behavior: Second Stage 
We now investigate the optimizing behavior of the local government at the 
beginning of period 1.    As in section 4.1, the local government's survival constraint 
(6) is effectively binding here only under the condition that the central government 
changes A in response to local expenditures of period 1, as summarized by equation 
(20-1,2).   
Hence, LG maximizes 
11 SD Ygk β =+ −−  
subject to the survival constraint 
1 () ( ( ) ) vg vPk U δ += . 










δη −=         ( 1 8 - 2 )  
  If (18-1) holds here, then as in Game I we have (5-4) in the soft-budget case.   
However, (18-1) does not necessarily hold.  Let us compare the soft budget version 
of Game II with the hard budget version of game II. In the hard budget version of   18 
Game II we have (9).  Since  12 / g g vv  is not necessarily the same value in both 
cases, we do not know that k is really higher in the soft budget case than in the hard 
budget case.  When CG controls the local debt issuance, the soft budget constraint 
does not necessarily stimulate public investment. If  1 β η − = , both games have the 
same solution.  If 1 β η −>, in the soft budget version k is larger than in the hard 
budget version, and vice versa. 
We could analyze the first stage of this game.  Since CG again intends to 
attain (8), the property of first game is almost the same as in section 3.2. 
 
Welfare Comparison 
  Let us investigate the impact of an increase in k on CG’s tax revenue. Since 
D is fixed, we have now 
 R=(1 ) ' ' k f Jf β η −− = > 0        ( 1 9 ) ’  
Unlike Game I this value is always positive.  In other words, an increase in k 
always raises the right hand side of (2-3)’, which is beneficial.  If 1 β η −> and 
hence k is promoted, the resulting welfare in the soft-budget version of Game II is 
always greater than that in the hard-budget version of Game II.  On the contrary, 
if  1 β η −< and hence k is depressed, then the soft budget constraint hurts the 
social welfare. In this sense, the welfare implication of soft budget constraint is 
qualitatively the same as in Game I. 
 
5. Comments 
5.1 Welfare Implication of Soft Budget 
Several comments are useful.  We call the committed versions of Games I 
and II the hard-budget games, while uncommitted versions of Games I and II the 
soft-budget games, respectively.  When the central government commits to a 
predetermined value of β as the leader of intergovernmental game between central 
and local governments, the local government is subject to the hard budget 
constraint.  However, in this case the outcome is not the first best due to several 
factors such as the predetermined value of β, the rent seeking activity of LG, and 
the vertical externality of β.  Although the central government may not attain the 
first best by simply choosing  D   appropriately, CG could raise the social welfare by 
increasing  D .  
We have also shown that ex post the central government does not have an 
incentive to commit to a predetermined value of  β  in period 2 and may add new 
grants A after the local government determines its expenditures. Then, the local 
government is subject to the soft budget constraint.  Namely, when the local 
government raises local expenditures and borrowing in period 1, the central 
government has an incentive to support such larger local expenditures and   19 
borrowing by creating additional subsidies to the local government after the rent 
seeking activity was done.    It follows that in such a game the local government has 
a strong incentive to increase the local expenditures and borrowing in period 1.  
The central government may respond to such demand in period 2 by overthrowing 
the commitment if the marginal valuation of G2 is relatively small and/or a 
predetermined level of tax share parameter  β  is too low at the subgame perfect 
solution (1 β η −>).  
Two channels through debt issuance and public investment cause the soft 
budget outcome. First, local borrowing more in period 1 means a decline in local 
public goods in period 2 and hence upsets the central government's optimal 
allocation strategy, as stressed by Goodspeed (2002). Second, public investment 
more means an increase in the revenue of central government and hence the central 
government may subsidize the local government more in period 2, which is a new 
channel explored in this paper. 
We have shown that in the unrestricted scheme of local debt issuance the 
two channels work together. The soft budget would always stimulate k, which is 
beneficial, while it would also stimulate A, which is not beneficial. If 10 β η −−> , 
its positive welfare effect dominates the negative welfare effect of additional grants. 
We have also explored the ambiguous effect of soft budget in Game II on public 
investment in the restricted scheme of local debt issuance because the channel 
through debt issuance does not work here.  If 1 β η − < , the soft budget does not 
stimulate efficient pubic investment and hence it does not raise the social welfare.  
However, in this case an increase in k is always desirable. Hence, the welfare 
implication of the soft budget is qualitatively the same between two games, 
depending on the sign of  1 β η −−.  
 
5.2 Choosing  β  
First Stage 
  We now consider the case where CG may choose the optimal level of  β . In 
Game I LG’s optimizing behavior at the second stage is the same as in section 3. 
Thus, we consider the optimizing behavior of CG at the first stage below.   
  At the first stage of Game I, the central government maximizes the 
national welfare (1) subject to its budget constraints (2-3), and the response 
functions of local government by choosing parameter, β  as well as nation-wide 
public spending G1, G2 and public debt B.  Then  we  have 
Max  11 22 () () { () () } uG vg uG vg δ ++ +  
subject to   20 
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  is LG’s response function with respect to  β .    It is easy to show than 
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  Let us investigate the welfare implication.  In the hard budget version of 
Game I the ex post welfare is maximized when  2 (1 )Y β −  is maximized.  The 
impact of an increase in  β  on  2 (1 )Y β −  is  
 










−+− = −−      (25) 
which reduces to zero since (23) holds.  Thus, the ex post welfare is maximized by 
choosing  β   although it does not necessarily attain the first best solution. 
 
5.3 Benevolent LG 
  Suppose that LG is also benevolent.  Then, LG maximizes (1) subject to 
(3-3) at S=0 by choosing local public goods and investment, while assuming 
nation-wide public goods fixed.    Instead of the survival constraint (6), the following 










      ( 2 6 )  
The first order conditions of LG in Game I or II are the same as in section 2.  For 
example at Game II LG now maximizes 
  12 () ( ( 1 ) ) ) vD Y k v Y rD βδ β +− + − +  
by choosing k.  The optimality condition reduces to (9). The analytical results in 
section 3 would also be qualitatively the same. 
  As to the welfare implication, there are some differences between 
rent-seeking LG and benevolent LG, depending on the size of S.  Since S=0 in the 
case of benevolent LG, welfare is higher there. However, the welfare implication of 
soft-budget constraint may be qualitatively the same.    In the case of benevolent LG,   21 
an increase in A would always raise the ex post welfare from  12 , gg .  Thus, if the 
welfare from  12 , GG   can be raised by putting additional transfer A to LG and hence 
by stimulating k, the total social welfare is also raised.     
As shown in 4.1 and 4.2, the welfare effect from  12 , GG is ambiguous, 
depending on the sign of 1 β η −−.  Since we now have the positive welfare effect 
due to raising  12 , gg , the overall effect may well be beneficial.     
 
5.4 Debt Financed Public Investment 
  We consider the restriction that local debt is only used for financing public 
investment. 
  Dk =  
Then, the optimizing problem of LG at the second stage of Game I is to maximize 
  11 SY g β =−  
subject to 
  12 () ( ( 1 ) ) vg v Y rk U δβ +− + =       ( 2 7 )  
The optimality conditions are (27) and 
  '( ) 1 f kr β =+        (7-1) 
  The level of k is the same as in Game I.  However, we do not necessarily 








greater than in Game I, resulting in lower social welfare than in Game I. The main 
analytical results concerning the soft budget constraint would qualitatively the 
same. 
 
5.5 Spillover Effect of Local Public Investment 
  The vertical externality is the key factor to obtain the result that in the 
hard budget constraint local public investment is too low.  If we incorporate 
spillover effect of local public investment we could get the similar result as well.  
Namely, local public investment becomes too low in a world of multi-local 
governments where each local government determines its public investment 
non-cooperatively.  In this sense the assumption of a given share of tax revenue 
between the local and central governments is not essential.  We could obtain the 
similar analytical results if we incorporate the spillover effect of local public 
investment in a world of multi-local governments. 
 
5.6 Inclusion of Private Consumption 
    If we explicitly incorporate private consumption into the model, 










where  12 , cc   are private consumption in period 1 and period 2,  t  is a tax rate, and 
y  is income.  Then we may define the tax revenue as ty Y = . Since Y is an 
increasing function of k, y is also an increasing function of k at an exogenously given 
tax rate.    Thus, the welfare from private consumption is increasing with k as well.  
In section 4 we have shown that if k is raised due to the soft budget constraint, it 
may be better.  Such an analytical implication holds even if we consider the 
welfare from private consumption.  In other words, the main analytical results 
hold when we explicitly incorporate private consumption. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have investigated theoretically the soft-budget constraint 
with grants from the central government to the local government by clarifying the 
vertical externality of local expenditures due to overlapping tax bases between two 
governments using a two-period model.  We have also explicitly incorporated 
political rent seeking activities by local politicians to explore both the benefit and 
cost of soft budget constraint.   
The central government’s benevolent incentive results in creating a soft 
budget constraint by increasing grants. Two channels through debt issuance and 
public investment cause the soft budget outcome. First, local borrowing more in 
period 1 means a decline in local public goods in period 2 and hence upsets the 
central government's optimal allocation strategy, as stressed by Goodspeed (2002). 
Second, public investment more means an increase in the revenue of central 
government and hence the central government may subsidize the local government 
more in period 2, which is a new channel explored in this paper. 
It is interesting to note that public investment becomes too little due to the 
vertical externality of tax revenues. Hence the soft budget constraint may well 
improve social welfare although it induces rent-seeking activities. We have shown 
that in the unrestricted scheme of local debt issuance the soft budget constraint is 
effective to stimulate both efficient local expenditures and additional grants 
because the two channels work together. If the marginal valuation of G2 is relatively 
small and/or a predetermined level of tax share parameter  β  is too low at the 
subgame perfect solution (1 β η −>), then the soft budget case is welfare improving. 
We have also shown that in the restricted scheme of local debt issuance the channel 
through debt issuance does not work. Thus, the soft budget constraint may not 
stimulate public investment and hence may not be better than in the hard budget 
constraint. Here again the welfare implication depends on the sign of  1 β η −−. 
We could regard the soft budget constraint with local debt control the most   23 
interdependent case of intergovernmental financing and the hard budget constraint 
without local debt control the most independent case of intergovernmental 
financing. We may say that the degree of decentralization is very high in the latter 
case, while the degree of decentralization is very low in the former case.    When we 
consider some positive externalities of local public investment such as the vertical 
externality, these extreme cases may not perform very well. Namely, the relatively 
independent case of the soft budget constraint without debt control may perform 
better than the hard budget constraint without debt control if 10 β η −−> .  The 
welfare implication of soft budget constraint with debt control is generally 
ambiguous, and it could be better than the hard budget constraint without debt 
control if  10 β η −−> .    Our analysis have shown that the marginal valuation of G2 
and the level of tax share parameter β  are crucial to evaluate the relative 
performance of soft budget constraint and local debt control by the central 
government.   24 
Appendix 1: Multiple Local Governments 
 
Suppose there are n (≥2) local governments.    If we define the total amount 
of local public goods as  12 , gg   and each local government’s supply of public goods as 
12 ,















=∑        ( A 1 )  
The social welfare (1) is now rewritten as 
 
i W = 11 22 () () { () () }
ii uG vg uG vg δ ++ +      ( A 2 )  









  We may define other variables of local governments as in (A1). Then the 
budget constraints of CG and LG are the same as in the text.  For simplicity 
suppose all local governments are identical.    It follows that in the section of 2.2 the 
first best conditions are given by 
  11 g G vn u =         ( A 3 - 1 )  
  22 Gg un v =         ( A 3 - 2 )  
and (5-3)(5-4). (A3-1) and (A3-2) correspond to the well-known Samuelson condition 
of the pure public good, G. We have analytically the same results as in sections 3 
and  4.   
Regarding the game between CG and LG, we may assume that each LG 
behaves non-cooperatively and regards other LG’s choice variables given.  Then, 
the analytical results are the same as in the text.  For example, (12) may be 
rewritten as 




j i = + + + + + + ∑ ∑
≠ ≠
     (A4) 
Then, central government’s response functions are in place of (14-1)(14-2) given as 
  (,)
ii i i AJ D k =         ( A 5 - 1 )  
  2 (,)
ii i i gP D k =         ( A 6 - 2 )  
Similarly, we have 
22 (1 ) '( )
ii i i dG dg r dD f k dk ++ + =  
  22 (1 )
i dG dg ηη −=  
  2 (1 ) ( )
ii i dG f k dk dA β ′ =− −  
Hence, we have (15-1,2,3,4) as in the text. 
   25 
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Table 1 
 
  Game I  Game II 
  Hard budget  Soft budget  Hard budget  Soft budget 
12 / g g vv   (1 ) r δ +   (1 )(1 ) r η δ + −   ' f β δ   (1 ) ' f η δ −  
12 / GG uu   (1 ) r δ +   (1 ) r δ +   (1 ) r δ +   (1 ) r δ +  
k  1' rf β + =   1' rf + =  k(SD)>k(HD)  if  1 β η −> 
W W  (HD)<W(SD)  W(SD)>W(HD) if  1 β η −> 
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